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Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity
Robert R. Wright*
In stating a formula for payment of non-scheduled permanent
partial disability, the Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Act provides for compensation "to the injured employee for the proportionate loss of use of the body as a whole."' Practically speaking, this
meant to Arkansas lawyers for many years that when a physician
assessed permanent partial disability at 20% to the body as a whole,
that figure represented the loss suffered and the basis of the recovery to which the employee would be entitled. 2 If physicians differed on the percentages, it was simply a matter of reconciling the
differences. If one doctor's evaluation was 10%, while another's
was 20%, the referee might have concluded that 15% was a reasonable recovery. In any event, the attorneys, the referee, and the
Workmen's Compensation Commission were dealing with a figure
or figures allocated to an injury by one or more physicians, who
were speaking of a functional, physical loss of use of the body in a
3
given amount.
*Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Continuing Legal Education
and Research, University of Arkansas.
'ARK. STAT. ANN. §81-1313 (d) (Repl. 1960).
'The Arkansas Act provides that a non-scheduled permanent partial disability shall be apportioned to the body as a whole and that the body as a
whole will have a value of 450 weeks. ARK. STAT. ANN. §81-1313 (d) (Repl.
1960). The injured employee receives compensation for the proportionate loss
of use of the body as a whole. If the Commission concludes that a claimant
has suffered a permanent disability resulting in 20% loss of use of the body
as a whole, the claimant is entitled to 90 weeks of compensation. Under ARK.
STAT. ANN. §81-1310 (Repl. 1960), compensation may not exceed 65% of the
average weekly wage and shall not be greater than $35.00 per week nor less
than $7.00 per week. Scheduled permanent partial disability is covered under
ARK. STAT. ANN. §81-1313 (c)
(Repl. 1960), in which certain permanent injuries are allocated a fixed number of weeks. In a situation involving a
scheduled permanent injury, e.g., as an amputated arm, estimated percentages
of disability are not involved because the percentage (in terms of number of
weeks) is fixed by the statute. This article, for that reason, does not apply
to scheduled injuries.
'By "functional" or "physical" disability, we are of course speaking of disability in a purely anatomical sense. It is a type of disability which has no
connection at all with loss of income or loss of earning capacity, but purely
with loss of part of the physical effectiveness or usefulness of the body and the
ability to perform certain physical acts.

Legally, all of this changed with Glass v. Edens.4 The qualifying, adverb, "legally," is used beaus e there, seems to. be every indication that the vast majority of Arkansas compensation: cases which
might appropriately concern themselves with the Glass v. Edens rule
do not do so. 5 It will be the purpose here to review Glass and its
use in subsequent Arkansas permanent disability cases, and also
examine briefly wage-loss or loss of earning capacity, as an jelement
of disability and its development in other states.. From the examination of this conc6pt in decisions 'of 'other states, some guidelines may be established which will be of benefit in Arkansas."
,THE ARKANSAS

RULE

Glass v. Edens was a heart attack case in which the permanent
partial disability 6 of the dlaiffiant,'Glass, was fixed at 40% to the
body as, a whole. Glass, however, contended on appeal to the Ar.
empiloyer,
kansas Supreme Court-that he was totally.disabled. Te
Edens, argued. that "loss of use of the body as a whole, rferred' only
to functional or anatomical loss., But the .Supreme, Court held 'tat
it included "'in.varying degrees'in
each instance,' loss',of Use of the
body to earn substantial wages."7 After qu ig at leng'th fro Larson on Workmen's Con pensatidn,8 the -court concluded 'that. "'con'233 Ark. '786, 346 S.W.2d '685'i(1961).: It'must be' said,here' at the beginning, in .all honesty, that the court's construction-of the statutory,. phraseology
(ARK. STAT., ANN. §81-1313 (d)
(Repl. 1960)) was somewhat strained, no
doubt for the purpose of bringing 'Arkansas within'the scope of the par'&v'iliiig
law in the majority -of American"jurisdiction.' The phrase, "loss 'Of use' of th6
body as a whole," when viewed from -the standpoint of the English' language
rather than from the standpoint of judicial theory,;and .purpose , seems clearly
to mean "bodily, loss" in the anatomical sense. However, it is not the .purpose
of this :pape'r to challenge the bsi of the decision'.
5
This' is' indicative riot 'only from 'the sparsity of cases on this, subje.ct,
but also from the statement of the Chairman of the Workmen's 'Compensation
Commission, who wrote in a letter dated July 15, 1964: "For a very great
length of time following this decision few attorneys made use of, the doctrine.
Gradually, more attorneys 'are developing cases under the doctrine announced
in that case.
(Glass v. Edens). However, the number of instances is still
quite few." Letter from the'Hon. Ernest Maher to tle author, July 15,, 1964.
"2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S'COMPENSATION LAW §57.10 (1961) states that
there are only twO' categories of workmen's compensation benefits: '(1) those
fdr physical injury, and (2) death benefits to dependents. The first' category
is divided, according to Larson, into (a) Wage-loss disability payments; and '(b)
hospital, and medical' expenses. "Here, of course, We are' coricerned' with category (1) (a).
'233 Ark.'786, 787,-346 S.W.2d 685, 686 (1961).
'The court's 'quotation, and the' basis for its conclusion, *ws'
from 2 L'ARSON, op. cit. supra note 6, §57.10, as follows- "The'key to the 'uriderstanding of
this problem is the 'recognition, at the outset, that the disability concept is a
blend of two' ingredients, whose recurrence' in different proportions gives ise
to most controversial disability questions: the first ingredient is disabilit,'in
the medical or physical sense, as evidenced by obvious loss of members'or by
medical testimony that the claimant simply cannot make the necessary fmusciular
movements and exertion's; the second ingredient is de facto inability to earn
wages, as evidenced by proof that claimant has not in fact earned aiything .
"The two ingredients: usually occur together; but each'may' be found
without the other; a.claimant, may be, in a medical ,sense, utterly' shattered and
ruined, but may by sheer determination and ingenuity. contrive to make a living
for himself; -conversely, a claimant may be able -to work, in .both' his and the
doctor's opinion, but awareness of his injury may lead employers. to refuse him

sideratidn should'have been jgiven,.along :with the/.medicalevidence,
to the appellant's age, education, .experience, and,. other .,matters affecting 'wage loss."9 The court cited 'no.previous. Arkansas cases
since there vwere none to cite.. The.court stated thatthe referee,
who a1iparently had :relied on 'a previous Commission decision,i;°
had' erroneously considered' -only medical! evidence.",- Thus,,, in
June; 1961,. with the'Glass casbi it became the Arkansas , interpretation that'resolution of the problem of -disability was dependent on the
proper balancing of the physical or functional ,disability on the one
hand and the 'wage-loss factor' on :the other. This did not mean that
functional disability was no 'longer -to be considered, but only. that
the wage-loss, must also be considered and these factors "balanced!
by'the-Commission in arriving at the award.-:
'

To determine wage-loss, the court indicated, that various factors enter in.' Specifically mentioned were the age,, education ard experience of the employee.' In a situation involving, for example,. a
60 year-old manual laborer suffering a ,25%, functional disability, in
the form .of,.a back ,injury, the claimant, might, be. unable to obtain
employment due to the combination of -his .limited qualifications, his age, and .the injury suffered. If this employee. (or, a
younger man for that matter) were, unable to obtain .work or perform, non-manual labor due to lack of, education'. intelligence, age,
or experience,.the result generally. would be total disability or substantially larger disability from-the ,standpoint of wage-loss. Iis recovery of compensation, i.e., his "disability," would depend, on the
proper emphasis to be' given his wage-loss disability when, compared
to his functional, disability... The, court leaves the balancing of these
factors to the Commission, 12 whose 'decision presumably would be
upheld as long as .it,
were not unreasonable, arbitrary.or ,capricious.
The obvious iresult,
ihowever,
s that in the. type of, situation described, the employee is entitled to recover.more than his functional disability, although usually less than his wage-loss disability. In, most
situations, it seems unlikely that the employee could not perform
any type of 'work.- Also, coniidefation-'should be given to' whether
he could 'be trained to perform other work~of an equally remunerative
nature in which case wage-loss disability might thereby be reduced.
employment.

These two illustrations will expose "at 'once the error that results
with either the medical or the -vage-loss aspect- of disability.
An absolute insistence, on' mecIical,'disability in the abstiact 'would jioduce a
from preoccupation'

denial of compensation in the latter case, although the -wage-loss is as real and
as directly traceable' to the injury -as 'inany other 'instance.' At 'the other extreme; af insistence 'on, wage-loss' ,as' the test 'would deprive the' claimant in the
forrer illustration' of 'an award, thus' not only penalizing his laudable efforts 'to
make the best of his misfortune, but also fostering the absurdity of pronouncing
a man non-disabled in spite of the unanirnoui contrary evidence -of' mrilical experts and. of common observation.. The 'proper balancing of -the medical and
the wage-loss factors is, then, the! essence of the" 'disability' problem in workmen's compensation."
'233 Ark. .786,788, 346 S.W.2d '685, 687 (1961).
'°Tlhe 'referee's opinion cited DeBin v. Kaiser Endn'eers, 2i14,Ark. Workmen's Comp: Comm'n 3 (July, 1960).
.!233 Ark. 786,788, 346 S.W.2d 685, 687, (1961).
"gMann v. Potlatch Forests, 237 Ark. 8, 371 S.W.2d 9 (1963).

Glass v. Edens has been involved in only two Arkansas Supreme
Court cases i3 since the decision was handed down, the chief one of
which was Mann v. Potlatch Forests." In that case the claimant
sought a higher percentage of disability than the 25% permanent
partial awarded him by a prior order of the Commission. In testimony before the Commission, the medical witnesses for the respondent attributed the increased disability to pulmonary emphysema,
which was unrelated to the original injury. Claimant's medical witness did not mention pulmonary emphysema. On appeal from an
adverse opinion of the Commission, the claimant argued that the
medical witnesses for the respondent erroneously failed to consider
claimant's age, occupation and other factors in evaluating his disability. However, the court said that the Glass case places the duty
on the Commission, and not the doctor, to consider these elements,
and that the record showed that the Commission "was made aware
of our holding in the Glass case, and we cannot say it did not follow
that holding here in arriving at appellant's disability."'15 While the
basis for the result in this case seems eminently correct, in that it is
ultimately the duty of the Commission to determine reasonably and
in good faith whether the wage-loss factor should enter into the disability computation, the language of the decision leaves something
to be desired. The court should do more than just assume that the
Commission considered these other factors because it "was made
aware" of the Glass case. If all the Commission has to do to dispose
of wage-loss consideration is to indicate that it is aware of the Glass
case, the same as a testator might disinherit his prodigal son by
mentioning him in his will, then Glass v. Edens will not amount
to any more than the Commission wants it to. Presumably, however,
the court felt that the Commission acted reasonably in the Mann
case in not increasing the percentage of disability based on loss of
wages; and presumably if the Commission acted improperly, arbitrarily or unreasonably in failing to consider the wage-loss factor,
the court would reverse.' 6
Another aspect of the problem which the Mann case should not
have glossed over is the use of testimony on the part of physicians
"Mann v. Potlatch Forests, supra note 12; Wilson Hargett Constr. Co. v.
Holmes, 235 Ark. 698, 361 S.W.2d 634 (1962).
"237 Ark. 8, 371 S.W.2d 9 (1963).
An oblique reference was made to the
theory underlying Glass when the Court stated that the Compensation Law
was to be construed liberally "to the end that injured employees shall be remunerated for loss of earning power." Clemons v. Beardon Lbr. Co., 236 Ark.
636, 642, 370 S.W.2d 47, 50 (1963).
But the Glass case was not cited and
Clemons was a case dealing primarily with the independent contractor relationship.
"5237 Ark. 8, 10, 371 S.W.2d 9, 10 (1963).
"While Commission decisions are accorded the sanctity of a jury verdict,
Aerial Crop Care, Inc. v. Landry, 235 Ark. 406, 360 S.'W.2d 185 (1962), Arkansas-Best Freight System v. Shinn, 235 Ark. 314, 357 S.W.2d 661 (1962), the
Commission cannot act in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. See Baker
v. Slaughter, 220 Ark. 325, 248 S.W.2d 106 (1952). The Act itself is to be
construed liberally to effectuate its purposes. Parrish Esso Service Center v.
Adams, 237 Ark. 560, 374 S.W.2d 468 (1964); Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Smith,
237 Ark. 468, 374 S.W.2d 166 (1964); McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 237
Ark. 448, 373 S.W.2d 401 (1963).

bearing upon the wage-loss consideration. While the court quite
properly held that physicians are not obligated to take the wageloss factor into consideration in assessing a percentage of disability
(which, of course, means functional, physical, or anatomical disability to physicians), this does not prevent the use of medical opinions
bearing upon the physical ability of a claimant to perform certain
work. In a situation involving an employee, who through education
and experience is equipped only to undertake hard manual labor,
medical testimony is an obvious device to establish that the man
is unable to perform this type of work. Thus, while the doctor's
disability figure is not affected by such testimony, medical testimony
may be utilized to lay the groundwork for an assertion of the wageloss factor or loss of earning capacity.
In the other case, Wilson Hargett Constr. Co. v. Holmes,17 apportionment of disability between the heart attack in question and a
previous heart attack was involved. The Commission concluded that
the disability should not be apportioned, 18 and in reaching its decision as to the amount of disability, it gave weight to the age, education and experience of the claimant, relying upon Glass v. Edens.
It found the claimant totally disabled at the present and for a period yet to be determined. The Arkansas court held that the Commission correctly followed Glass. Although this case was concerned
primarily with apportionment of disability between the two heart
attacks, it is noteworthy for the continued application of the Glass
formula.
While other cases might have been concerned with wage-loss, 19
Mann and Holmes are the only two which have mentioned it since
the Glass decision.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT IN OTHER STATES

Arkansas was one of the last states to give consideration to loss
of wages or diminution of earning capacity as an element in determining awards for disability. While the Arkansas court in Glass v.
Edens did not purport to institute a new rule for Arkansas, from a
practical standpoint, that was the result. In exploring the decisions
of other states, it should be remembered that the manner in which
courts determine these cases as well as the rules evolved by the
courts and the statutory provisions vary widely from state to state.
It is not the purpose here to make a comprehensive examination of
the decisions in all states, but simply to point up some of the inherent problems through a consideration of selected decisions.
17235
1

Ark. 698, 361 S.W.2d 634 (1962).

Based on McDaniel v. Hilyard Drilling Co., 233 Ark. 142, 343 S.W.2d

416 (1961).
9

" E.g., Tiner v. Baldwin, 235 Ark. 1010, 363 S.W.2d 532 (1963), which
was concerned, among other things, with permanent partial disability. Glass v.
Edens was not mentioned by the Arkansas Supreme Court, nor by the Commission in its opinion, 229 Ark. Workmen's Comp. Comm'n 102 (Oct. 1961).
The wage-loss factor was apparently not asserted. Since Glass v. Edens. however, the factors stated therein should properly be considered in all permanent
disability claims (which are not otherwise scheduled).

Larson states categori.elly'that it is "uhiformly'held,; r.without
regaid to statutory Variations"' that'a finding of: disability mnay. stand
even 'wl.we the' post-injury'earnings of the claimant exceed .his preinjury'earnings.20: Decisions 'of tWenty-three 'states,'"the District- of
Coftimbia.En'gland and a -federal- court are. cited in',support..of ;the
stat~ment.' 'Certainly, -this' is the majoiity rule 'and :theabetter.Irule,
b6causeb there- are '6ther ' factors which' should -be .considered,- e.g.,
the fact 'that the ifijury' 'may provide a deterrent to ,futurejtemployment. ' Mor'eove'r,'"the term, "wage-loss,". should properly .be viewed
in-the-'broader sense odf a. loss of earning capacity' or,the7loss of
abilityL to earn §ubstahtial 'wages. ,This' is not, .necessarily "the unifori' rule, however.'; Montana, for example, has, stated thit disability
is not total where the claimant's' earning :power, is 'not)"'wholly
destroyed" and he can still perform remunerative employment, and
if the employee's post -,jiry-earnings" are "regular aid 66htiiiuous,"
he' cann't' asseft 'disability l based 'oh''future uicertainti 6 .21' The
Montana' court 'iherD'bY sustained 'a "de'hial 6f 'cmp6'
.
nsati- fieh'en
though the',daimant had a' 'p'eiintge of' b6dily'diiability,' iffice "it
hai n6t' prevented him Ifrom engaging inw6rk"2 2 ' for'the 'same or
greater wages. An6ther,Montna case' denied c6ope.stin's
until
such. time as-the claihant actu'ally s'uffered'mr6hetary' loss due to in;albiity to work resultinig fio iii'the accidet.23 It is apparent that
Sn"Montana, the l6ss of eainig capacity'"riule hias'bec6iie so'c6stricted as to deny 'ielief in' cases in Which' recbvery w'uld have been
granted in 'Arkansas' before Glass -v Edens, 'and afterwards for 'that
matter, based purely upon functional or bodily disability. Sirmila¥y,
the Texas statute has be.en interpreted to mean that "partial incapacity- cannot exist unless the average weekly" wage earng capacity after injury is less than average weekly wages. before injury."24 But in the case of total incapacity, Texas holds that com',

202 LARSON, 'Op. cit. .sfpranote.6, §57,2 1.
21

McKinzie v. Sandon, 141 Mont. 540, 380 P.2d 580 (1963).

2

'1 1d. at 582.
SGaffiey v. Iindustrial Ac.
Bd., 133 Mont. 448, 324 P. d 1063' (958):
'In Shaffer v. Midland;'Empire Packing'Co., 127 Mont.' 211, 259 P.2d 340 342
(1953), Montana had. stated-. that .the test was whether there "has been. a loss
of earning capacity ,-. a, loss of ability to earn in the open labor market." The

Gaffney case indicated that "loss of earning capacity" would' be determined
pui ely in dollars and cents' with respict'io
wages 'before and after 'the infjur'y.
The Montana court reiterated the Shaffer language in Obie -';'Obie' Signs: Inc.
142 Mont. 617, 386, P.2d 68 (1.963), but cited Friedt v.: Industrial Acc'-.Bd.,
136 Mont. 141, 345 ,P.2d 377 (1959), tothe effect that "until such diminution
in wages) occurs "or becom'es' demonstraliy imminnt, apella nt's ' cual earnirgs are the most reliable 'standard 'for'"determining' his earning... ca
ity." - In
Murray 'v.! Elliston Lim6'.Co., 140*Mont. '511, 374, P.2d' 229,; 230:'(1962), the
Montana court stated thqt it would not make the "liberal construction concept
a vehicle by which able-bodied workmen can achieve semi-retirement 'at the expense' of 'insurers."
One must necessarily conclude from. a fair reading of the
Montana cases that whatever semantics may be employed, "loss of. earning' capacity".in Montana almost invariably refers,.to less income after the accident
than before. See also Graham v. ,Tree Farmers, Inc., 142 Mont. 483, 385.P.2d
83 (1963) and. Lind.v. Lind, 142 Mont. 211, 383 P.2d 808 (1963).
4

Texas Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 162 Tex. 394, 347 S.W.2d,,605,
606 (1961), based on TEXAS CMvIL.STAT, art. 8306, §11 (Vernon Supp.' 1964).
In 1957, the Texas, statute was changed so that compensation for' partial incapacity would not be computed on the basis of the percentage of disability.
274

pen ati6n is' paid for loss of earning capacity rather than loss- of
earnings;* and -the fact that' an' employee works 'and earns wages
after the accident is not conclusive as to', the question of total incapacity. 2 5

'In

Rhode Island, incapacity is compensable only for a

6
loss of earnings resulting therefrom6.

Without attempting.-to catalogue all. :jurisdictions, it. is aPparent that some courts determine earning capacity, solely .by a comparison of pre-injury and post-injury, average wages. While .the
post-injury earnings may create a presumption, .as will be discussed
later, exclusive use of this rather- arbitrary and mechanical method
is neither the, majority view nor the better practice. -In most situations, other factors must reasonably be.considered. One court stated
that it had adequate information to determine earning capacity where
it knew the employee's "previous work history, his education and
training, his capacity to work after the accident, the sort of work
he Was doing, the nature and de"ree 'of' the 'injury to his 'back, its
effect on h'is activities, and his eainifigs past and present. '27 The
court could consider the claimant's lack of education 'and experience,
the limiting effect of the injury, and "use its' general knowledge as a
basis 'of 'reasonable 'forecast." 2 8. In Minnesota, although evidence
of postLinjury earnings creates' a presumption of earning capacity, the
test is not what the employee earns after the'injury but what he is
5

' Maryland Cas. Co. i. Goet , 337 S.1W.2d .749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960),
allowed recovery where an employee suffered gastritis from inhalation of paint
fumes, which rendered him permanently allergic. See also Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. Waters, 356 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) which held that
where a millwright fell through a floor, hit'a ladder and landed 'on -the next
story, he had suffered total incapacity under'the evidence, which implies the
disability to perform the, usual tasks of a workman and not merely the tasks
of a- particular tradei Hawkins v. Texas Etmployers'. Ins. Ass'n, 363 'S.W.2d 788
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963) in which it was held error to instruct the jury that if
the claimant can work' in an, employment' suited to his experience, he .is not
totally incapacitated, where evidence showed he had worked in a grocery store,
cafe, and barbecue place, before becoming a boilermaker; and Cunningham.v.
Texas'Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 363 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), in which
it was held. that a,jury was justified in granting total disability to an, employee
due to'a back condition where he had not "worked for 16 weeks between a
hernia operation and the trial and where the back injury was the cause of his
incapacity. Needless to say, claimanis in Texas appear to seek recovery for
total incapacity wherever possible. The theoretical inconsistency with respect
to. measurement of partial incapacity as opposed to total incapacity seems
obvious.
inSee Taylor v. Artie's Auto Sales, Inc., 89 R.I. 165, 151 A.2d 380 (1959),
in which no error was found in denying compensation to an automobile salesman whose average weekly wages were $4.54 less after the accident than before,
where there was no showing that the differential was due to the injury.
7
" Latour v. Producers Dairy, Inc., 102 N.H. 5, 148 A.2d 655 (1959).
New Hampshire holds that its statute affords compensation not for injury suffered but for loss of earning capacity, Davis v. City of Manchesler, 100 N.H.
335, 126 A.2d 254 (1956), and actual earnings after the injury are not conclusive in determining earning capacity. Dunbar Fuel Co. v. Cassidy, 100 N.H. 397,
128 A.2d 904 (1957).
The test isthe difference in the average.weekly wage
before the injury and the average weekly wage the claimant can earn thereafter
in suitable work under normal conditions of employment. Joyce v. Chicopee
Mfg. Co., 103 N.H. 471, 175 A.2d 521 (1961). See also Desrosiers v. Dionne
Bros. Furniture Co., 98 N.H. 424, 101 A.2d 775 (1953).
"5 Latour v. Producers Dairy, Inc., 102 N.H. 5, 148 A.2d 655 (1959).
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able to earn. 29 Thus, if he cannot do heavy labor, or cannot obtain
employment even if he can perform same, his earning capacity is
obviously affected. Turning the situation around, however, the fact
that the employee has 'not worked since the injury is not in itself
determinative of the extent of loss of earning capacity.30 Medical
estimates of disability, as well as the consideration of earning capacity, furnish bases for calculation of compensation for partial disability although neither should be used to the exclusion of the other.3 1
Mississippi lists the factors to be considered in wage-loss determination as increase in general wage levels, the employee's greater
maturity or training since the accident, longer hours worked after
the accident, payment disproportionate to the employee's capacity
due to sympathy, and the temporary and unpredictable character of
post-injury
income, in addition to the post-injury wage actually re32
ceived.

Without proceeding further, it is obvious, as mentioned earlier,
that loss of earnings or "wage-loss" in other states customarily refers to a loss of earning capacity. There may be a diminution in
earning capacity even though the employee continues to work at
his old job or similar employment for as much or greater income,
since the injury may constitute a deterrent to obtaining and retaining work.33 As an example, this could be especially true in the
"Roberts v. Motor Cargo, Inc., 258 Minn. 425, 104 N.'W.2d 546 (1960).
Here, the employee could not do heavy labor and could not maintain steady employment, and his earning capacity was obviously affected. This was all traceable to the injury and the unwillingness of prospective employers to hire him
because of their fear that he might not be able to perform. See also Richter v.
Shoppe Plumbing Co., 257 Minn. 108. 100 N.W.2d 96 (1959).
"0Bowen v. Chiquola Mfg. Co., 238 S.C. 322, 120 S.E.2d 99 (1961).
"Bowen v. Chiquola Mfg. Co., supra note 30. The South Caroli-a court
stated that the average amount of post-injury wages furnishes a reasonable basis
for comparison with average pre-injury wages in determining diminution of
earning capacity, although it is not conclusive. Similarly, medical estimates
should not be used exclusively. This is essentially the same conclusion as the
Arkansas court reached in Glass. See also, Keeter v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 225 S.C.
389, 823 S.E.2d 520 (1954).
Karr v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 216 Miss. 132, 61 So. 2d 789
(1953), which reversed and remanded because these factors were not considered, despite the fact that the claimant was making a higher wage after the
accident than before. The Mississippi statute quoted in this case specifically
compared average earnings before the accident with the wage earning capacity
thereafter. See also, Elliot v. Ross Carrier Co., 220 Miss. 86, 70 So. 2d 75
(1954), in which the Mississippi court held that a stipulation that the claimant
was 25% disabled did not mean a 25% disability in wage earning capacity and
that the factors listed in the Karr case must be considered. A similar case is
Garris v. Weller Constr. Co., 132 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1961), in which the Florida
court held it error to find loss of earning capacity to be the same percentage as
the percentage of functional disability unless this conclusion is based on a consideration of the elements which determine earning capacity.
"See e.d., Smith v. Perry Jones, Inc., 185 Kan. 505, 345 P.2d 640 (1959);
Peschka v. Wilkinson Drilling Co., 192 Kan. 126, 386 P.2d 509 (1963); and
Howerton v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 191 Kan. 449, 381 P.2d 365
(1963).
In Batte v. Stanley's, 70 N.M. 364, 374 P.2d 124 (1962), the New
Mexico court held that earning as much or more after an injury as before is not
conclusive that a worker's earning ability is not impaired. Thus, where the
employee's earnings were reduced 17%, an award of 60% disability was sustained because of a finding that the claimant was "probably disabled" from
doing any manual labor and was not qualified to do anything else. The statu-

case of an employee who suffers a heart attack or back injury and
returns to work. If subsequently laid off, other employers would
be reluctant to hire him because he would be a bad risk.
When talking about "earning capacity," as we have seen, the
cases are not dealing entirely with the before and after earnings
of the injured employee, although those figures have significance.
Earning capacity refers to the ability to earn substantial wages over
a continuous, indefinite period of time. The courts or commissions
are therefore faced with the necessity of making a present determination, based on the available facts, of the employee's future
earning potential or, conversely, his future earning deficiency. As to
the weight to be given the post-injury earnings, Larson states that
this figure creates "a presumption of earning capacity commensurate
with them, but the presumption may be rebutted by evidence independently showing incapacity or explaining away the post-injury
earnings as an unreliable basis for estimating capacity. ' 34 Larson
points out that a number of factors may make post-injury earnings
unreliable, such as the increase in wage rates since the accident,
longer hours worked by the employee after the accident, payment
of unrealistic wages by the employer out of sympathy, the temporary or unpredictable character of the wages, or greater training
since the injury.3 5 Also, the probable future effect of an injured
back or other bodily defect must be considered in that the employee
may have an increasingly difficult time performing his work and
competing in the labor market. All of these considerations enter into
determination of the award. Obviously, however, if the employee is
back at work at his old job, making as much money as he made
previously, the presumption must necessarily be that there is no
loss of earning capacity.3 6 The burden should be placed upon the
tory definition of disability in New Mexico relates to the wages the employee
"earns or is able to earn." See also note 28, supra.
812 LARSON, Op. cit. supra note 6, §57.21.
352 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 6, §§57.21. 57.31-.35.
86See 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 6, §57.22. Larson refers to this as a

"strong presumption," and while that appears to be true in some states, in
others it would seem to be no more than an inference. Certainly, some states
allow the presumption to be overcome more easily than others. While Montana
obviously gives great weight to the before and after earnings (see note 22,
supra), Kansas does not hesitate to grant recovery even though the post-injury
earnings are as high as the pre-injury earnings.

In Smith v. Perry Jones, Inc.,

185 Kan. 505, 345 P.2d 640 (1959), the Kansas court allowed recovery based on
substantial medical testimony even though there was no diminution in wages,
stating that a bodily disability is a "definite loss" and a "deterrent to his obtaining and retaining work." Tn Howerton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 191
Kan. 449, 381 P.2d 365 (1963), the court stated that a partially incapacitated
employee does not forfeit his right to recovery by remaining in the same employment at the same wages, and that loss of earnings may result from inelig'bility to obtain work as well as from inability to perform. In Tabor v. Tole,
188 Ken. 312, 362 P.2d 17 (1961), the court reversed the reduction of an award
because it felt the lower court had based the reduction on the fact that the
claimant had obtained a teaching position at higher wages. Kansas defines disability as the inability to perform the same work as before the injury. See also
Shepherd v. Gas Serv. Co., 186 Kan. 699, 352 P.2d 48 (1960), and Daugherty
v. National Gypsum Co.. 182 Ken. 197, 318 P.2d 1012 (1957). New Hampshire
follows the standard rule that there may be a loss of earning capacity even
though there is no reduction in earnings, but if the court concludes that his post-

claimant to overcome this: presumption with persuasive evidence.
Of course, the mere fact that the employee had, returned to- work at
the same wages would'not prevent a' recovery in Arkansas based
upon bodily or functional disability, although the amount of the
award would normally be reluced unless the presumfiption Were overcome. '

"

'

.

'

-

'

Some' differentiation is'made between states on - the: basis of
whether.-the employee is able to perform his former job or has taken
new, 'employment. The, result -is that in a few. states,,, where the
employee is receiving the same or higher wages, ,but in,.a different
he
loss of earning capacity, because
jobi-there is deemed to be -a
38
7
cannot perform:his old job.3 In most states this is not true. _It
seems 'unrealistic''to equate-loss of earning capacity with inability'to
perform the same type-of Work, .since the theory relates touthe
general ability'to earn substantial wages rather than the ability to
perform a Specific type of work. This is particularly true-where
the injured' employee is earning more and has a greater, potential in
his. new job. :Of course, ;there. may be situbtions in.which the
former-work is the only kind the claimant can perform,.,aild then
there is a definite loss.

--

., ._-If, an employee is able to perform odd jobs, but is unable to obtain or hold regular employment 'due to injury suffered, ,this does
not, prevent a, finding, of total disability from. the standpoint. of
earning capacity nor does it necessarily require that an earlier adjudication of total disability be reduced to partial disability. 9 This
is simply another facet of the principal that the basic test is that of
earning capacity, rather than. the amount earned. Obviously, where
injury wages reflect his true earning capacity, it is immaterial that he cannot
perform his former job or others for which he was previously qualified. Joyce v.
.
Chicopee Mfg. Co., 103 N.H. 471, 175 A.2d 521 (1961).
SMichigan, Louisiana, Nebraska and Kansas so. hold. See Kaarto v. Calumet & Hecla, Inc., 367 Mich. 128, 116 N.W.2d 225 (1962) (an injured employee
denied recovery because he could perform his former occupation, even though
it was depressed due. to economic factors and he could do very little else);
Lindsey v. Continental Cas. Co.,242 La. 694, 138 So. 2d 543 (1962); Corley, v.

Childs. Big Chain, 146 So. 2d 251 (La. App. 1962); Swaney y. Marquette. Cas.
Co., 139 So. 2d 74 (La. App. 1962); Tilghman v. Mills, 169 Neb. 665, 100 N.W.
2d 739 (1960); and the Kansas cases cited in note 35 suora.
Clark
(1960);CityP.2d
Ariz.,154,
Comm'n,
v.Industrial
"White
of
514, 72348
A.2d
489922(1950);
Mfg.'Co.,.
i36 87
Conn.
v.. v..
Henry
& Wright
Hialeah v. Warner, 128 So. 2d 6.11 (Fla. 1961);

Pullman Co. v. Indlustrial

Comm'n, 356 Ill. 43, 189 N.E. 874 (1934); Quincy Retirement Bd. v. Contribut ory Retirement Appeal Bd., 340 Mass. 56, 162 N.E.2d 802 (1959); Frennier's
Case,.318 Mass. 635, 63 N.E.2d 461 (1945); Joyce v. Chicopee Mfg. Co., 103

N.H. .471, 175 A.2d 521 (1961); Silke v. Walter, 65 N.J. Super. 36, 166 A.2d

837 (1960); Chromey v. Argentieri, 10 App. Div. 2d 749, 197 N.Y.S.2d 642
(1960); Lane v. General Tel. Co., 85 Idaho 111, 376 P.2d 198 (1962); Lozano

v. Archer, 71 N.M. 175, 376 P.2d 963 (1962); Smith v. Swift & Co., 212 N.C.
608, 194 S.E. 106 (1937); McQueen & Johnson v. Morgan, 190 Okla. 219, 122
P.2d 155 (1942)_; Rennard v. Rouseville Cooperage Co., 141 Pa. Super. 286, 15
A.2d 48 (1940); Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Sloan, 180 Tenn. 220, 173 S.W.2d
436, 149 A.L.R. 407,(1943); Greeneville Cabinet Co. v. Ramsey, 195 Tenn.
409, 260 S.W.2d 157 (1953); Federal Underwriters Exch. v. Simpson, 137,S.W.
2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
192 LARSON, op. cit. supra,note 6, § 57.51. This is the so-called "odd-lot"

doctrine.

the evidence reveals that the claimant is.incapable of holding regular
employment, he has incurred,,a substantial .wage-loss .disability or loss
of earning capacity which may well be "total" depending, on the
circumstances. Similarly, where the' inability t- 6btain :regular employierit ''results from the injury sustained,the conclusioh must
necessarily be the same as in the 'situation in which the employee is
unable to wok.4° ' Of course, ihe'burden is on the claimant to estab:
lish that he-ha atteinpted to' find eriployiaent and has' b6en dnable
t6 do':so As- a result of -his injury,4: and -the 'employer may defetnd
on the 'basis'that'the claimant did-notf "ccept 'suitable employment
or tliat "suiitable emplo yment' is ,available
arid'the claimant"did 'not
42 .
mhakenreasonable efforts to' l6cate same. '
I.GUIDELINES FOR ARKANSAS

PRACTICE

From the foregoing it is 'apparent' that Aikansas has only
scratchedthe surface in' consider'ingth'e prbern involved" i' the
determination f wage-los disability. 'These issues. will ho doubt be
developed, to'.a greater degree, howev'er, as lawyers become morle
a'wfre 'of'the'impfications 'of Glass v. 'Edens. 'It is 'therefore "rorthwhile to consider the rules developed i.i other 'states in an' Arkansas
coiitextY
Arkansas apparently- will not be burdened with the preoccupatioi with wage-loss induilged in, by, some jurisdictions. As some of
the foregoing
some, states is tied almost
LA' ' cases indicate,"recovery
"';
'
" in,
43"
exclusively to loss of earning capacity.., B.ut the Glass decision
states, and tle better view' "is, that the, proper., determination is
reached, through aI balancing of wage-loss disability with physical,
functional disability. The coirt has said that it would be an injustice to consider only one of these elements to the exclusion of the
other.' 'The problem in Aikais'as is to promote and require consideration of the wage-loss factor along-"with functional disability. For
this,'to be developed, properly in Arkansas; -in line' with the Glass
decision and the prevailing view in the,.majority of American. jurisdictions, .the., following .principles or .guidelines should- be utilized:
S1.inall cases involving :permanent total disability or-nonscheduled iermanent partial disability, consideration should be
given to (a), functional, physical disability, and,. (b), wage-loss disabiiity.
-,'Wright ,v., Purepac Corp.,, 82 N.J. Super. 100,, 196 .A.2d 695. (1963);
Quiles v. Ilew Jersey Metals Co, 37 N.J. 91, 179 A.2d 393 (1962); Texas
Enrriloyers' Ins. 'Ass'n. v. King, 346"S.W2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). But cf.
Fryman v. Moore ,Bridge 'Co;' 366 P:2d 949 (Okla. 1961).
.. "'Prince. v. Industrial Comm'n, 89 Ariz.-314, 361 P.2d 929 (1961);
Schnatzmeyer, y.. Industrial Comm'n 77 Ariz. 266, ,270 P.2d 794' (.1954); Fawley
v. Doehler-Jarvis Div. of National Lead Co., 342 Mich. 100, 68 N.W.2d 768
(1955); Pelchat v. Portland Box Co., 155 Me. 226, 153 A.2d 615 (1959); Gee
v. Burlington, 120 Vt. 472, 144 A.2d 797 (1958).
'"See 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 6,.§57.66.
"E.g., the Montana and New.Hampshire cases cited in notes 22 .and 26
supra. See also Taylor v. Artie's Auto Sales, Inc., 89 R.I. 165, 151 A.2d 380
(1959); Henderson v. Iles, 250 .Iowa.,787, 96 N.W.2d 321 (1959).

2. The term "wage-loss disability" is synonymous with loss
of earning capacity or loss of ability to earn substantial wages.
3. In determining "wage-loss disability": (a) If the claimant's post-injury earnings are as high or higher than prior to the
injury, this creates a presumption that there is no wage-loss, but
the claimant may rebut this presumption by evidence that his injury or disability has seriously limited the work available to him
(based on age, education or experience), will operate as a deterrent
to future or continued employment or advancement, that claimant's
hours worked are longer, that the remuneration since the accident
is due in whole or in part to sympathy, that his post-injury income is
temporary or unpredictable, that general wage levels have increased
or that greater training or maturity entitles him to receive more
than he is receiving; and (b) if the claimant is not working and
claims inability to earn substantial wages, consideration should be
given to his age, education, experience, capacity to perform or to be
trained to perform other less strenuous work, his previous work history, medical testimony as to his ability or capacity to perform certain types of work, whether the claimant has sought suitable employment, what employment is available to the claimant, and whether
the claimant's injury will deter or prevent employers from hiring
him.
4. In balancing wage-loss disability with physical disability, no
mathematical formula can be established with respect to the emphasis to be given each factor due to variation in circumstances, but
(a) in a case involving total or substantial wage-loss and a lesser
percentage of physical disability, the amount of recovery will necessarily be increased over that allowable for physical disability only;
and (b) in a case involving no loss of earning capacity, or an amount
smaller than the percentage of physical disability, the ultimate recovery will normally be diminished.
Some comment is perhaps merited on point 4(b). In a previous
brief mention of the Glass rule, the comment was made that the case
was a "windfall" for claimants' counsel. 44 But what is sauce for the
goose is sauce for the gander. If inability to earn wages increases
recovery, then in like measure the ability to work should diminish
recovery. This would seem to be the obvious conclusion from Larson's statement, which the Arkansas court adopted, that "the proper
balancing of the medical and the wage-loss factors" is "the essence
of the disability problem" and that it is improper to insist on either
element as the exclusive test.4 5 The conclusion seems inescapable
that a "proper balancing" of these factors should normally enable
the respondent to reduce the award in situations in which there is a
total absence of wage-loss disability, or in which the wage-loss disability is substantially smaller than the physical disability. 46
"Wright, Defendant's View of Workmen's Compensation Heart Cases,
16 ARK. L. REV. 234, 237 (1962).
The Glass case was only given passing
mention and the full ramifications thereof were not considered.
4"2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 6, §57.10.

"A clear-cut illustration would involve a back iniury suffered by a clerical
or office employee.
The wage-loss implications might be minimal or totally

PROOF OF WAGE-LOSS

As in the case of circuit and chancery courts, opinions of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission are not published and are
not generally available to Arkansas attorneys. 47 Yet, the great
majority of compensation claims are not appealed, and the Commission's decision is final. In a few Commission decisions, the
Glass rule has entered into the determination, particularly with respect to the proof necessary to increase recovery due to wage-loss.
In Holland v. Mobley Constr. Co.,48 the evidence developed that the
claimant had an eighth grade education, had performed only manual labor prior to his heart attack and was untrained for other
work. The claimant had gone back to work for the same employer
in an office job at a higher wage. The Commission noted that the
medical proof established only a 15% anatomical disability, and
then stated:
However, we must consider the fact that claimant's opportunity for
future employment has been appreciably reduced by his physical
condition which is attributable to his employment ....

The Com-

mission would be benefited by testimony on behalf of the parties by
experts in the employment and economic fields in cases such as
this. Thus, we would have the benefit of expert opinion evidence
regarding future wage loss factors. However, in this case, we do not
have the benefit of such evidence. We are of the opinion that the
claimant's future possibilities for earning wages equal to that which
he was receiving at the time of his attack have been reduced because
he can no longer perform the duties for which he is qualified by his
limited education, his employment background, and his lack of
specialized training."9

The Commission then awarded 25% permanent partial disability.
This case clearly indicates that as far as the Commission is concerned, Arkansas will follow the principal enunciated earlier in this
article that wage-loss refers to loss of earning capacity and that the
fact that the employee is back at work at higher wages in less
strenuous work will not prevent a recovery where his injury pro'vides a deterrent to future employment. Presumably the Commis,sion concluded that the presumption of no wage-loss due to increased
post-injury earnings had been refuted by the fact that the claimant
,could no longer perform the heavy labor for which he was qualified
land due to his education and experience was limited in his em'ployment potential. However, as mentioned earlier, equal or higher
post-injury wages create a presumption that there is no wage-loss,
and this must be refuted by substantial evidence to the contrary.
The Commission in the Holland case felt it could have profited
from additional testimony of an economic nature on the adverse efabsent. This is not to say, of course, that this rule would be limited to office
or clerical employees. Reduction of the award due to absence of wage-loss
is far better and fairer to all concerned than the policy followed by many
states (as mentioned previously) of denying compensation altogether in the
absence of loss of earning capacity.
"A set of opinions of the Workmen's Compensation Commission may be
found in the University of Arkansas Law Library in Fayetteville, as well as in
the Justice Building in Little Rock.
"251 Ark. Workmen's Comp. Comm'n 252 (Aug. 1963).
1"ld. at 254.

fect of the claimant's injury on his future employment possibilities.
-In Adney v. Brown-Olds Plumbing & Heating Corp.,50 the .Commissin felt t'at these facts were uy developed. In that case,the
claimant 'contended for permanent"total disability from the stand-,
'point of wage-loss. He was only able ,to work part-tine after .the
injury and performed no work at all for months at a.time.'' When
he 'did work, he. generally performed lighter or clerical 'Wrk'due,to
his condition. 'Eventually, he obtained steady' empioyment' p'erformig light wrk' for an air conditioning company. . The clain't
was
39, hadi eleventh grade education, and his onlyr experience was in
pumbing 'and pipefitting. Two orthopedists testified that the. claim

afit could n6 t 'pe rfori

heavy lifting,r and both gav'e'-t hin '10'%

permanent partial di'sab lity. "Five journeym'en pipefitters,. the supervisor ofplumbing at 'the U rersity Medical Cente'r, and a master
plumber' all'testfiid t6 the effect that the clairmant' could no longer
perform his old work and in fact could only do about 10%obf the
tasks involved, in plumbing or'pipefitting.' The witnesses generally
concluded that this rendered him. unemployable for siuch work.' The
respondent offered n6 'cbtfrry e4 idence. The Comi'm'ssi6i"a'.warded
45 %. permanent partial, disability and stated these .nclusions:
This is the first case .to come before tne Commission -ire,which tne
facts have been exhaustively developed under the doctrine~ announsome
the case" of 'Glass v. Edens. The Commission "has,.
ced
prevuios cases, had occasion to render decisins in which. there ,has
been 'less'. -extensive" proof on' behalf of the* claimant Juride.this
a.t.unde r...hi.
'....
'
'
concept of tlhe law. * * *
In support of the respondents' position, the undisputed fact is that
the claimant has been working in the plumbing industry. at. lighter
work for wages' equal to r greater than those which he was receiving at the time of his injury; It would, we 'think, be' maiife'stly
unjust: to refuse 'to. give, such a. fact very earnest consideration .as'
one of the several factors to ,be considered in'determining the extent,
'6f p ernanent disability.

The Commission then quoted from'Glass to'the' dffect-"that -the'esL
sence of the problem'was the 'proper balancing of 'the'riedicai 'a:nd
wage-loss factors. This attempt 'at' balanicing 1'piovided' the''comnmis sion with "its greatest difficulty,' but it stated -that it 'arrived 'at the
45% figure' by taking "into account 'all of the factors which 'we have
discussed:" Presumably the'recovery would: have be n 'gre'at(r hid
the claimant' notfound' 'steady employment performing'light wdk

at equal or':higher' wages. Also; the Commission apparently viewed
the presumption of'-no wage-loss; created'by the fact 'that'th'e 1 laii-n,ant was now employed at equal or higher wages, as 1having been refuted at least in' part, by the,testimony that the claimant could no

longer perforni heavy work' and had been rendered incapable of performing the duties ,of a journeyman, plumber and pipefitter 5 2 Thus,
"o255 Ark: Workmen'sComp. Comm'n 248 '(Dec. 1963).
1d;at 259.
"'This should not be interpreted as adoption of therule nentioned in note
37 supra, in which compensation is granted if the employee cannot, perform his
former' job. Apparently, the emphasis on this factor was due to the fact ,that
this was the only type of work the claimant was trained to: do.,iHis earning
capacity had obviously suffered- since ,he. had, become,.seriously 1limitdd in the
range of jobs available to him.
51

despite current employment,. the, Commission apparently felt that
the claimant's earning capacity had been substantially diminished
and his injury provided" a" deterreiat 'to future employment,: which
'
thereby', justified an -increased "award. '.:A valid criticisrmi', of' the
Adney and Holla'nd cases, hoviever, is' that the Conimission did, not
ostensibly give sufficient consideration to the presumfption'of 'absence
of wage-loss resulting from each cldimant'sVdemonstrated' earning-capacity.
Pickle v. Paul Hardeman,!Inc.,15 also involved a situation 'in
which the, claimant alleged, 50% permanent partial disability ,based
on wage-loss. The employee was 28. years. old, had not completed
high school, and had been a construction, worker for 10. years.. After
his first injury, he had returned .to work, for.. a short period and had
been discharged .because his work was unsatisfactory. He was later
reinjured, or the previous injury aggravated, while working for.. a
second employer., His employment had eventually, been terminated
and he had worked only about 50%o..f the time in the approximately
7 1/2 months preceding the, hearing. ,The proof, showed a substantial
decline in annual earnings. The assistant business manager for the
union testified that the claimant's job turnover had greatly increased
since his injury and that he could keep the claimant employed only
about half of the time on light work. Medical testimony set the
claimant's anatomical disability at 10% to 15%. The Commission's
award was 20% permanent partial disability. The Commission
stated it was "incumbent on the claimant to establish that he will
in the future sustain wage losses in proportion to the degree of permanent disability which he seeks us to allow. '5 4 The Commission
felt that this had not been thoroughly accomplished, but:
There are some factors that partly support the claimant's position.
He has sustained a wage loss. He has less than a high school education, and is limited in his experience and training. The medical
proof reflects that he cannot do some of the hard, heavy work involved in his occupation. The commission also has the testimony
of the claimant himself, which supports his contention that from
a wage loss standpoint he is to some extent permanently disabled
more than the 10% to 15% anatomically which the physicians have

given him."5

The conclusion one must necessarily reach from a comparison
of the Adney and Pickle cases is that in the handling of claims for
permanent disability, the claimant should not only assert the Glass
doctrine, but should also offer substantial proof of wage-loss or inability to perform work for which he is qualified, thereby resulting
in a decrease in earning capacity and a reduction in future emiployment potential. This proof is best provided through proof of
actual wage-loss, testimony of physicians as to the inability of the
claimant to perform heavy work, testimony of those experienced in
claimant's field as to his inability to perform that type of work, and
testimony of personnel or employment experts as to the claimant's
present and future prospects for employment based on his circumstances.
"'259
Ark. Workmen's Comp. Comm'n 73 (April 1964).
4
Id. at 84.
Ibid.

5
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CONCLUSION

The element of loss of earning capacity provides a fertile field
for development in Arkansas compensation cases. This aspect should
be considered in all workmen's compensation cases in Arkansas
which involve claims for permanent disability (but which are not
otherwise scheduled). Since the Supreme Court has said that
wage-loss is an element to be considered along with physical disability, the Commission should inject this consideration into all claims
for permanent disability which are filed, and if the attorneys have
not offered proof on the subject additional evidence should be required prior to the decision. For since the Glass decision, this is a
consideration which must be weighed as a part of the final determination, and a proper and legally acceptable conclusion as to permanent disability cannot be reached otherwise. Furthermore, the absence of wage-loss is as relevant as its existence, and to ignore this
factor is to omit an essential feature of the equation. Over the long
run, if the rule is wisely and reasonably applied, the result should be
a more accurate determination of disability.

